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Basel III: The impact of an increase in regulation in a recession framework 
 
Abstract 
This work project aims to assess the impact of Basel III’s proposal in the Portuguese 
banking sector, a sector experiencing particularly difficult times in a distressed country. 
The industry is represented by its three largest quoted banking groups, two of them under 
government intervention. The impact is evaluated through the estimation of the banks’ 
capital ratios through Basel III’s expected implementation calendar, through the analysis of 
the banks’ capital needs based on their publicly available information and industry 
research. The impact will vary depending on the bank; on average, it will result in a 
decrease in banks’ excess capital. Banks will have difficulties to comply if state-owned 
CoCos are not considered part of regulatory capital. The new standards will penalize those 
banks with a recent history of poor performance, and decrease the difference between 
regulatory and equity capital. 
Keywords: Banking; Basel; regulation; Portuguese banks. 
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1. Introduction 
Banks played a massive role in the 2008 global financial crisis. Helped by a regulatory 
framework that was inadequate at best, ill-considered investments and flawed risk-
management systems had negative effects not only on the individual banks but on the 
economy as a whole. The real side of the economy is particularly sensitive to the banking 
sector, requiring public entities to enforce rigorous mechanisms to prevent bank failures, 
thus promoting stability in the financial system and enduring economic growth. In this case, 
it did not happen as many banks could only be saved with taxpayers’ money. 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS, acronyms used in Exhibit 1), 
created in 1974, is a group of national bank supervisory authorities that seeks to improve 
worldwide supervisory standards. Over the years, the BCBS’ importance has grown, 
becoming the leading supporter of a globally consistent regulatory framework. The BCBS 
created Basel III
1
 global regulatory standards with the goal of increasing banks’ resilience. 
The standards follow the same principles as previous BCBS recommendations, but stand 
out as imposing stricter limits on leverage, requiring banks to hold considerably more 
equity and manage their liquidity in a more prudent manner. 
This Work Project (WP) is focused on assessing the impact of Basel III’s implementation 
in Portugal. It addresses the three main quoted Portuguese banking groups:  
- Banco Comercial Português, S.A. (BCP);  
                                                          
1
 BCBS. 2010 (revised 2011). Basel III: A global framework for more resilient banks and the banking system. 
Basel: Bank for International Settlements (BIS). and BCBS. 2010. Basel III: International framework for 
liquidity risk measurement, standards and monitoring, Basel: BIS. 
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- Banco Português de Investimentos, S.A. (BPI)  
- Espírito Santo Financial Group S.A (ESFG), a Luxembourg-based financial holding 
company which fully consolidates Banco Espírito Santo S.A. (BES). 
Caixa Geral de Depósitos is not included due to being state-owned and, thus, having access 
to completely different capital sources, independently from the market. Banif - Banco 
Internacional do Funchal, S.A. (or any other entity from its financial group) is not taken in 
consideration as it is going through a restructuring that will sharply change its capital 
position. 
Portugal’s implementation of Basel III is occurring in the midst of an international 
Financial Assistance Programme
2
. Due to the Portuguese state’s inability to finance its 
growing debt, the Programme requires banks to keep high capital levels and provides a €12 
billion recapitalization facility to be used, if necessary, by banks struggling to comply with 
regulatory capital requirements through market financing. BCP and BPI are currently using 
this facility. 
Because Portugal is part of the European Union (EU), these standards will not be directly 
applied by the Bank of Portugal (BoP), the national regulatory authority, but by the 
European authorities. In order to apply previous regulatory standards, the European 
Commission (EC) enacted directives that were then transposed to national regulation by the 
BoP, which had some scope to adapt them to Portuguese market specificities. Basel III is 
expected to be implemented more uniformly across Europe. The current implementation 
                                                          
2
 Banco de Portugal. 2011. Portugal EU/IMF Financial Assistance Programme 2011-2014. Lisbon. 
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proposal from the EC is the 2011 CRD IV package; for the purpose of this WP, we will use 
its latest version, from May 21, 2012
3
. It includes a regulation proposal (known as the 
Capital Requirements Regulation: CRR) that is supposed to be enforced directly across 
Europe, without variance. CRD IV functions as the document applying Basel III, but varies 
considerably from the BCBS text
4
. Not yet in its final version, changes are still being 
discussed by European leaders—the BCBS considers it, in some respects, non-compliant 
with Basel III
5
. 
With those caveats, we believe the CRD IV proposal most accurately represents the future 
regulation applying Basel III. It is the only document developed by those entities likely to 
produce the final text. Therefore, this WP will estimate the impact the package would have 
on the banks if applied in its current form. The many effects that cannot be estimated using 
only publicly available information will not be addressed. 
We will analyze aforementioned banks’ 2012 semiannual reports
6
 in order to estimate their 
capital needs throughout the CRD IV implementation period. We will primarily address 
equity capital, since other capital instruments have not yet been issued. Liquidity 
requirements will be described and compared based on current regulations. However, 
                                                          
3
 Council of the European Union 2012. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms – Council general approach. 
Brussels. and Council of the European Union 2012. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit 
institutions and investment firms and amending Directive 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms 
in a financial conglomerate – Council general approach. Brussels. 
4
 James, Benedict, and Andrew Forde. 2001. Comparison between Capital Requirements Directive IV and 
Basel III. London: Linklaters LLP. 
5
 BCBS. 2012. Basel III regulatory consistency assessment (Level 2) Preliminary report: European Union. 
Basel: BIS. 
6
 The third quarter reports were not used due to their lack of detailed accounting information, this information 
is essential to estimate the adjustments to capital due to Basel III. 
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unclear CRD IV definitions in this matter and a lack of bank-provided information prevent 
reliable numerical estimates of their liquidity positions. 
2. European regulatory framework 
Three pillars comprise the Basel II accords
7
 (the current European regulation follows these 
accords’ framework). The first is the minimum capital requirements, where Basel III 
introduces considerable modifications. It is this pillar that will be addressed throughout this 
WP. Pillar two provides supervisors with a framework to assess banks’ risk. Pillar three 
regulates banks’ information disclosure to allow market participants to better assess capital 
adequacy, exposures, and risk management practices. 
Pillar one is based on the notion that banks need to hold a minimum ratio of capital to their 
total Risk Weighted Assets (RWA); the total RWA contain amounts for credit, operational, 
and market risk. Regarding the banks analyzed, credit risk makes up more than 90% of 
their RWA. Its calculation consists in multiplying the value of each asset by its 
corresponding risk weight; the risk weight is higher for riskier assets (e.g. higher for loans 
to SMEs than for investment-grade sovereign bonds). Risk weights can be estimated using 
inputs from credit rating agencies and regulatory data (known as the Standardized Method), 
or using internal supervisor-approved models (known as the Internal-ratings-based [IRB] 
method).  
                                                          
7
 BCBS. 2006. International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards – A Revised 
Framework – Comprehensive Version. Basel: BIS. It includes the Basel II accords (released in June 2004) and 
several smaller BCBS accords. 
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There are two types of IRB methods: Foundation IRB and Advanced IRB. With Foundation 
IRB, banks use internal models to estimate Probabilities of Default for specific loans’ 
portfolios, using regulatory data concerning the other necessary parameters to calculate risk 
weights. Advanced IRB allows banks to calculate risk weights using all the required 
parameters estimated through their internal models. One advantage of using internal models 
is that it encourages banks to thoroughly analyze their exposures and to improve their risk 
management, allowing banks with complex and effective risk management systems to be 
more levered. Market risk is estimated using Value At Risk models as they consider the 
impact of market fluctuations on the banks’ capital. Operational risk has a broad definition 
as it arises from failed internal processes, people, or systems, or from external events; it 
encompasses different risks like those created by possible fraud, accidents or legal risk. 
Capital, according to the CRD IV, consists of different types of instruments that are 
classified according to their loss absorption capabilities: Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1), 
Additional Tier 1 (AT1) and Tier 2 (T2)—CET1 being the most loss-absorbing instrument, 
followed by AT1. CET1 is the book value of equity, after several accounting adjustments 
and considering only common shares. AT1 are perpetual hybrid instruments with non-
cumulative distributions which can be converted in equity as needed; T2 is subordinated 
debt. These instruments have to comply with a set of CRD IV conditions, including being 
converted to common equity if the bank is considered non-viable. The CRD IV contains, in 
its regulation, minimum ratios for CET1, Tier 1 (the sum of CET1 and AT1), and capital: 
the sum of the three types of capital instruments. 
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In its directive, the CRD IV requires banks to hold two CET1 capital buffers: the capital 
conservation buffer and the countercyclical buffer. For the purpose of this WP, I will 
assume that banks have to hold the countercyclical buffer as not holding it severely restricts 
income distributions. Due to the current European financial crisis, I will assume that banks 
do not have to hold the countercyclical buffer as it is supposed to only be in effect in times 
of credit growth. 
Besides lower minimum capital ratios, the previous regulation contained different rules 
regarding the definition of capital: AT1 and T2 were not so loss-absorbing; and, instead of 
CET1, there was the concept of Core Tier 1 (CT1), which included some preference shares 
and was computed using different accounting adjustments.  
The CRD IV also introduces the requirement that banks hold sufficient capital to comply 
with a minimum non risk-based leverage ratio of 3%. The ratio is defined as Tier 1 capital 
divided by the total exposure (assets and off-balance sheet items). This requirement will 
start to be monitored by the supervisor in 2013, disclosed in 2015, and implemented as a 
mandatory requirement in 2018. The high level of RWA/Total assets in Portuguese banks 
means that this ratio will not have an impact on the banks analyzed. 
Basel III contains two new liquidity requirements, a completely new feature vis-à-vis Basel 
II. They will be explained later in this WP, though their impact cannot yet be quantified 
using public data. 
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2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Minimum CET1 + buffer 3.5% 4% 4.5% 5.125% 5.75% 6.375% 7% 
Minimum T1 + buffer 4.5% 5.5% 6% 6.625% 7.25% 7.875% 8.5% 
Minimum total capital + buffer 8% 8% 8% 8.625% 9.25% 9.875% 10.5% 
Phased-in deductions 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 100% 
The implementation schedule concerning the capital ratios is above; the impact of the new 
accounting deductions is not fully implemented at a given date, but phased-in according to 
the percentages in Table 1. The accounting adjustments will be explained in detail below, 
while referring to the specific cases of the banks analyzed. The RWA calculation method 
will not change significantly with this proposal, and the impact on the banks analyzed will 
be minimal. Europe follows the CRD III
8
, a directive that is already part of the current 
Portuguese regulation
9
 and was fully implemented before June 30, 2012. This directive 
applies the changes in RWA calculation methods (concerning market risk), as well as other 
adjustments concerning securitizations and re-securitizations, issued by the BCBS as an 
answer to the 2008 crisis (known as ―Basel 2.5‖
10
). 
Historically and as exemplified by their response to Basel II and ―Basel 2.5‖, European 
authorities have lead the world in their implementation of BCBS’ proposals as we can see 
by their track record regarding Basel II and ―Basel 2.5‖, (which are not yet fully 
implemented in the other major economic bloc, the United States.) However, Basel III’s 
                                                          
8
 The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. 2010. Directive 2010/76/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 amending Directives 2006/48/EC and 
2006/49/EC as regards capital requirements for the trading book and for re-securitisations, and the 
supervisory review of remuneration policies. Official Journal of the European Union. 
9
 Banco de Portugal. 2011. Aviso do Banco de Portugal nº9/2011. 
10
 BCBS. 2009. Revisions to the Basel II market risk framework. Basel: BIS. and BCBS. 2009. Enhancements 
to the Basel II framework. Basel: BIS. 
Table 1: Implementation schedule considering the Capital Conservation buffer and ignoring the Countercyclical buffer 
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implementation has been hampered by several conflicts of interest between and among 
nations due to the sovereign debt crisis. 
3. The Portuguese case 
Portugal’s banking sector utilizes a substantially uniform business model; the market is 
dominated by commercially focused universal. Obviously, variances between players exist: 
for example, CGD is state-owned, and Banco Santander Totta is a subsidiary of a large 
international bank. BCP, BES and BPI are the three largest quoted banks (BES and ESFG 
belong to the same group) and, together with CGD and Banco Santander Totta, are the five 
largest Portuguese banks. There are some differences in the business models of the three 
banks: BES has the most investment banking activities, operating in several countries 
through its subsidiary BESI, while BCP is mostly a commercial bank. Their loan portfolios 
also differ, as BES is more exposed to corporates, and BPI to residential mortgages. These 
banks’ geographic exposure is similar as they develop most of their activities in Portugal 
and are expanding in emerging markets, primarily Angola and Mozambique. Although their 
emerging markets’ subsidiaries are a small part of the banks’ total assets, the subsidiaries 
remain significant due to the high profitability achieved in these countries. 
Currently, Portuguese banks hold high numbers of non-performing loans (NPLs), and are 
experiencing funding difficulties due to the Portuguese state’s position, as well as the 
regulatory pressure resulting from the EU-wide recapitalization exercise and Portugal’s 
10 
 
Financial Assistance Programme. Due to the Programme, BoP required banks to hold a 9% 
CT1 ratio in the end of 2011 and a 10% CT1 ratio by the end of 2012
11
. 
These banks participated in the EU-wide EBA
12
 capital exercise
13
, which required banks to 
have a 9% CT1 ratio on June 30, 2012 after deducting, from their CT1, a buffer related to 
the prudent valuation of banks’ exposures to European Economic Area (EEA) sovereign 
debt. The buffer is a fixed amount considering unrealized losses and prudent valuation of 
the banks’ EEA sovereign debt exposures on September 30, 2011; it does not consider price 
movements and changes in each bank’s bond portfolio after this date, but it considers 
impairments related to the sovereign debt (i.e., impairments losses decrease the buffer 
amount). EBA, in its final report concerning the capital exercise, requires banks to hold a 
nominal amount of CT1 that corresponds to 9% of their RWA on June 30, 2012, after 
deducting the previously mentioned buffer; this requirement has the goal of limiting the 
banks’ deleveraging. The capital exercise, done as a complement to the 2011 EU-wide 
stress test, was considerably simpler than the stress tests as it did not consider scenarios, 
nor did it analyze the banks’ asset quality. 
The 9% CT1 requirement (after the deduction of the sovereigns’ debt buffer) of the capital 
exercise was transposed to the Portuguese regulation
14
. Hence, banks had to comply with 
both the 9% CT1capital exercise requirement and the 10% CT1 BoP requirement (without 
                                                          
11
 Banco de Portugal. 2011. Aviso do Banco de Portugal nº3/2011. 
12
 The European Banking Authority is a European regulatory agency with the goal of harmonizing banking 
regulation cross the EU; among other activities it conducts stress tests, develops reporting frameworks and 
elaborates consultation papers on banking regulation matters.  
13
 EBA. 2011. EBA recommendation on the creation and supervisory oversight of temporary capital buffers 
to restore market confidence. London: EBA. and EBA. 2012. Final report on the implementation of Capital 
Plans following the EBA’s 2011 Recommendation on the creation of temporary capital buffers to restore 
market confidence. EBA. 
14
 Banco de Portugal. 2012. Aviso do Banco de Portugal nº5/2012. 
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any buffers). All the banks had to issue capital to comply; BPI—mainly due to its sovereign 
buffer (€ 1,184 million)—issued €1.5 billion. 
In order to manage its capital shortage, BES increased its capital in €1.01 billion by issuing 
common shares during the first semester of 2012. The issuance caused massive dilution for 
those shareholders who did not exercise their rights to subscribe new shares in the capital 
increase; the number of new shares was 175% of the previous shares outstanding. During 
the same period, ESFG increased its capital in €500 million, issuing 97% of the previous 
shares outstanding. Despite the capital dilution, this group was able to withstand the more 
demanding capital requirements without government support measures, an extremely 
positive situation as it allows the group to save on interest costs and limit state intervention. 
BCP had to submit a formal recapitalization plan
15
 where the Portuguese state subscribed 
€3 billion of Contingent Convertibles (CoCos). These securities are debt that automatically 
convertes into ordinary shares (conversion rate determined by the Minister of Finance) in 
case of a ―trigger‖ event. They pay semi-annual coupons with an effective annual rate of 
8.5% in the first year that increases each year, capping at 10% in the fifth year. CoCos are, 
according to current regulation, CT1. A ―trigger‖ event includes non-compliance with the 
minimum regulatory capital ratio, missing a coupon payment, being considered insolvent 
by the supervisor, not completely repaying the securities within the five-year period, or the 
failure to fulfill any other condition stated in the recapitalization plan. BCP’s plan is to 
repay €500 million in 2014, €1 billion in 2015, and €1.5 billion in 2016. BCP also 
increased its capital by €500 million in the third quarter of 2012; this value is not included 
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 Millenium BCP. 2012. Capitalisation Plan –Law 63-A/2008- June 4
, 
2012. 
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in this WP’s estimations as the capital increase occurred after June 30, 2012. The capital 
increase was guaranteed by the state, but the guarantee was not used as private investors 
subscribed the full amount. The number of new shares issued was 173% of the previous 
shares outstanding. 
BPI submitted a plan similar to BCP’s
16
 with the amount of state support via CoCos being 
€1.5 billion. By December 4, 2012 the bank had already repaid €300 million. BPI does not 
disclose the planned schedule to repay the CoCos; it can be any time before June 2017. 
During the third quarter of 2012, BPI issued common shares, increasing its capital by €200 
million. The number of new shares was 40% of the previous shares outstanding. BPI’s 
capital shortfall was mainly due to the sovereign debt buffer: €1,184 million after 
impairments. Every quarter BPI discloses how much this buffer would decrease from its 
September 30, 2011 level if it was recalculated using current market prices. For this WP, 
the position considered is the one on June 30, 2012, with €1.5 billion CoCos outstanding 
and before the capital increase. 
4. CRD IV’s impact on core capital 
In order to estimate the impact of CRD IV on core capital, we have used the banks’ balance 
sheets on June 30, 2012, and other information disclosed in their semiannual reports. 
Through analysis of the CRD IV proposal and the current regulation
17
, we composed a list 
of the main modifications in the method to calculate the banks’ core capital (i.e., the 
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 Banco BPI. 2012. Proposta. Ponto 1 da Ordem de Trabalhos da Assembleia Geral de Accionistas do 
Banco BPI S.A. de 27 de Junho de 2012. Anexo 1: Plano de Recapitalização. 
17
 Banco de Portugal. 2011. Aviso do Banco de Portugal nº3/2011 and Banco de Portugal. 2010. Aviso do 
Banco de Portugal nº6/2010. 
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changes from the current CT1 to CRD IV’s CET1). This is not an exhaustive list of all 
changes; it addresses simply those changes we believe to have a greater impact on the 
banks analyzed
18
. The changes are divided in two sections: in the first, the amounts are 
deducted outright from CT1 to estimate preliminary CET1; the second section consists of 
―threshold deductions‖, where the amounts deducted are only those above a given 
percentage of adjusted common equity. 
The way in which CT1 becomes CET1 is disclosed in Exhibit 2, assuming the proposal’s 
full implementation on June 30, 2012, without considering the deductions’ phasing-in. 
Some deductions are only an estimation given the unclear nature of the CRD IV proposal 
and the lack of bank-disclosed information in their semiannual reports and through their 
investor relations offices. BES’ capital is analyzed as it will be, as detailed below, highly 
relevant to the estimation of ESFG’s CET1. 
The ―excess of expected IRB losses over existing impairment allowances‖ is a value that 
represents the provisions that should have been accounted using the banks’ IRB models, 
but were not considered as the banks calculate their accounting provisions in a different 
manner. They were already disclosed in the EBA capital exercise and it would stay 
unchanged if the CRD IV proposal was in use. BES did not participate in the EBA exercise; 
we assume that its amount regarding this excess will be the same as the one from ESFG as 
BES congregates the great majority of ESFG’s banking activities. 
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 The decision to include this changes and not others was made after analyzing banks’ reports and asking the 
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BCP’s Rita Silva. The goal is to capture the changes that will have the highest impact in the bank’s capital 
position. 
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The non-compliant hybrid instruments we refer to are the CoCos, and the €51 million of 
preference shares BPI still includes in its CT1. The other preference shares issued by the 
banks are not included in their CT1. The CoCos are clearly not part of CET1 according to 
the CRD IV proposal as CET1 instruments need to meet all of a set of conditions including: 
no preferential distributions, and being classified as equity in the balance sheet and loss 
absorption to the same degree as all other CET1 instruments. BCP’s and BPI’s CoCos do 
not comply with these conditions; however, there is the possibility of the regulator issuing 
an exception to consider these government support measures as part of CET1. Such an 
exception would change all calculations (Exhibit 3).  
The full amount of non-controlling interests (NCIs)
19
 is currently part of CT1; this would 
not be the case if the CRD IV proposal were used since it does not consider NCIs in non-
financial entities as CET1. The proposal does not disclose if NCIs in insurance 
undertakings will be considered part of CET1; such a determination will be subject to any 
new regulation pertaining specifically to both banking and insurance activities. In the WP 
we assume that NCIs in insurance entities are not included in CET1. The only entity 
affected by this is ESFG, with 116 € million of NCIs; if a new regulation, allowing NCIs in 
insurance entities to be included in CET1, appears, ESFG’s CET1 will increase by a value 
up to this amount. We assume that half of the NCIs related to ―others‖ are in banks, and the 
other half in non-banking entities. 
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 NCIs are the portion of subsidiaries’ equity capital that is not owned by their parent corporation. It is 
included in the consolidated financial group capital, the one analyzed in this WP, as it is available to absorb 
losses in its subsidiary, which is fully consolidated. 
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Regarding NCIs in banking subsidiaries, the amounts above the subsidiaries’ capital 
requirements (including the buffers) are not considered as CET1. For example, in a 
subsidiary with a 10% CET1 and 20% NCI, considering a 7% CET1 minimum for the 
subsidiary, the minority interest part of the parent company CET1 would be 7/10 of the 
20%. The proposal does not disclose any scenario with non-European subsidiaries; it is not 
possible, due to the scarcity of disclosed information, to calculate every subsidiary’s CET1. 
Our assumption was deducting 20% of the NCIs below € 50 million. Regarding the 
subsidiaries with larger NCIs, we assumed that the other European banking subsidiaries 
(BCP’s subsidiaries in Poland and Bespar) will have to comply with this proposal (7% 
CET1), and that their CT1 would decrease 20% to become their new CET1; the NCI share 
of their excess capital above 7% was deducted. ESFG’s NCIs regarding BES in all the 
years analyzed were deducted using BES’ CET1 calculated in the same year; the deduction 
increased each year until € 1 billion in 2018. Given this value’s weight, the necessity to 
estimate BES CET1, as we have done, is obvious. 
The Mozambican BIM—Banco Internacional de Moçambique SA (BCP’s subsidiary), is 
subject to the local regulation which requires an 8% Tier 1; our assumption is that 
European regulators will allow BCP to consider its NCIs using the local requirement to 
calculate excess capital; therefore, we deducted the NCIs related to its excess capital. 
Angola, where all the groups have large subsidiaries, has a simpler regulation that requires 
only a 12% solvency ratio
20
. Considering the assumption regarding Mozambique, it would 
make sense to include some NCIs related to Angola, but fewer than in the Mozambican 
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case due to Angola’s regulation that does not distinguish between different levels of capital 
(i.e., Tier 1 and Tier 2). We assumed that European regulators will require banks to deduct 
the NCI amount related to the excess capital according to the Angolan regulation but, as a 
simple way of assuming a larger deduction, we have assumed that the share of NCIs to be 
deducted will be rounded up to one decimal. For example in BES Angola, with a 15.4% 
solvency ratio, we assume regulators will deduct 30% of the NCI as (15.4-12)/15.4 = 0.22 
and 0.22 will be rounded up to 0.3. 
These Angolan and Mozambican banks did not release semiannual reports; thus, the 
deductions were estimated using the 2011 reports as a proxy for the 2012 semiannual 
reports. BES Angola is an exception to this as, on December 10, 2012, its 2011 report had 
not been released, thus we have used its 2010 report as a proxy. Because of the use of 
different reports, the scarce African regulations and, especially, the lack of knowledge 
about European regulators’ future decisions regarding these issues, these estimates are 
inaccurate. 
Revaluation reserves, related to unrealized losses in the banks’ available-for-sale (AFS) 
portfolio and cash flow hedge
21
, are currently added back (net of associated DTAs: deferred 
tax assets) to capital to calculate CT1. The CRD IV does not allow this; hence we have 
subtracted these net reserves from each bank’s CT1. All the banks were penalized, 
especially BPI (€ 845 million) due to their large portfolio of Portuguese bonds with 
                                                          
21
 AFS portfolio is a portfolio of securities where its gains and losses are only recognized as revenues or 
expenses when the security is sold, reaches maturity, is impaired or disposed of in another manner. Its 
unrecognized gains and losses are recorded as revaluation reserves, part of shareholder’s equity. Cash flow 
hedge relates to the use of derivatives in hedging the banks’ exposures, mainly the mismatches related to their 
exposures to interests rates in the two sides of the Balance sheet. 
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enormous unrealized losses. During the second half of 2012, a period not considered due to 
the lack of other data, these unrealized losses decreased significantly. This will have a 
positive impact in BPI’s capital ratio as the deductions are phased-in; it impacts both the 
unrealized losses deduction (consequently, all the threshold deductions) and the DTAs 
deduction. Possible decreases in unrealized losses after June 30, 2012 are not included in 
the WP conclusions, though they are analyzed in Exhibit 4. 
Deferred tax assets (DTAs)
22
 are included in CT1 but, under the CRD IV proposal, they 
will receive a different treatment depending on their origin. There are three main types of 
DTAs in CRD IV, but Portuguese banks do not disclose their DTAs according to these 
types. Thus, we had to assume their division among the different types, and this estimation 
will not perfectly correspond to the actual values. The DTAs that do not rely on future 
profitability are, according to their definition in CRD IV, completely different from most of 
the large DTA items in the banks analyzed; as such, they will not be considered. DTAs that 
rely on future probability and arise from temporary differences are explained later as they 
are part of the ―threshold deductions‖. 
Those DTAs that rely on future profitability and do not arise from temporary differences 
are completely deducted from capital. They may be reduced, with some exceptions, by the 
amount of associated deferred tax liabilities (DTLs) if they are generated in the same 
country and the country’s tax authority allows their offset. Banks do not disclose their 
DTAs and DTLs according to the country in which they were generated. We assumed that 
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 DTAs are assets that may be used to reduce future income tax expenses. Its inclusion in regulatory capital 
arises from the assumption that banks will have future taxable profits where they can use these DTAs. 
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each DTA item can be deducted by the DTL that relates to the same item, bar the 
exceptions disclosed in the CRD IV. This is not a perfect assumption as it can misrepresent 
the reality by being biased in the favor of banks with more geographically diversified 
businesses and banks that aggregate more items of DTAs and DTLs in their reports. It is 
possible that we are overestimating these banks’ CET1, as we can be underestimating these 
banks’ deduction related to DTAs by offsetting its value by an excessive amount of DTLs. 
As these DTAs arise mainly from tax losses brought forward, the bank with the highest 
level was BCP, also the bank with the worst recent results. 
Authorities currently allow the inclusion of the defined benefit pension ―corridor‖ (the 
highest of 10% of the fund’s assets or liabilities)
23
 in CT1, as well as 25% of the 2008 
actuarial deviations
24
 (regarding the assets which were not transferred to the Social 
Security). These items are added back to capital after being deducted as part of ―other 
comprehensive income‖. The CRD IV proposal does not allow such exceptions; therefore 
we have subtracted these items from CT1. 
Following the previously mentioned deductions, it was necessary to calculate a preliminary 
CET1 value in order to estimate the remaining deductions required to compute the banks’ 
CET1. The preliminary CET1 is the CT1 after all the previously mentioned deductions. If 
the CRD IV proposal was in force, banks would have to deduct a portion of ―DTAs that 
rely on future probability and arise from temporary differences‖ from capital; the deduction 
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analyzed have negative actuarial deviations exceeding the ―corridor‖. 
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would be the difference, if positive, between the item’s value and 10% of the banks’ 
preliminary CET1. These DTAs arise from items that receive different accounting and tax 
treatments resulting in the possibility that the company will pay fewer taxes in the future; 
they were offset by associated DTLs using the same method as the other previously 
mentioned DTAs. 
The difference, if positive, between significant (higher than 10%) investments in financial 
institutions and 10% of the preliminary CET1 was also deducted. BCP has a large 
investment in an insurance entity (€ 341 million in Milleniumbcp Ageas Grupo Segurador, 
S.G.P.S., S.A.) that we deducted as any other participation in financial entities. If new 
regulation concerning companies with both banking and insurance activities is issued, this 
can change. In this case, the positive impact on BCP’s capital would be noteworthy. 
The value of the two previously mentioned items that was not deducted from the 
preliminary CET1 will be summed. The difference, if positive, between the result of the 
aforementioned sum and 15% of the preliminary CET1 will be deducted from the 
preliminary CET1. 
After application of all mentioned deductions, we obtain the CET1; to calculate the CET1 
ratio one has to divide CET1 by the RWA. The impacts of CRD IV on these banks’ RWA 
should be minimal and they should mainly address the exposures related to market 
activities and (re)securitizations. This analysis is made using banks’ semiannual reports; 
banks’ information regarding these matters is always scarce and even more so in the interim 
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reports as they are not required to hold the same information as in their annual reports.
25
 As 
a simplified way to model the impact of this increase in RWA on the banks’ capital 
positions, we increased banks’ RWA regarding (re)securitizations and market risk to 50%; 
this increase’s impact is residual, between 4 and 15 basis points on the CET1 ratio. This 
value is not included in the final results as it was calculated in a non-accurate way and 
analysts expect it to be even smaller. 
5. Banks capital position under CRD IV 
Phased-in 
Deductions 
BCP: RWA = 55,934 BPI: RWA = 25,410 
No CoCos Accepted As planned No CoCos Accepted As planned 
2013 
 
3.327 6,0% 11,4% 6,9% 2.140 8,5% 14,5% 11,5% 
2014 20% 2.858 5,1% 10,7% 6,9% 1.751 7,0% 13,1% 11,1% 
2015 40% 2.390 4,3% 10,0% 7,9% 1.362 5,4% 11,7% 10,6% 
2016 60% 1.921 3,5% 9,3% 9,7% 973 3,9% 10,4% 10,1% 
2017 80% 1.453 2,6% 8,6% 8,9% 585 2,3% 9,0% 9,1% 
2018 100% 984 1,8% 8,0% 8,1% 196 0,8% 7,6% 7,5% 
The table above shows BCP’s and BPI’s CET1 ratios during the phase-in period; BPI’s 
higher deductions are the result of its higher unrealized losses in the AFS portfolio. The 
results (except the column ―as planned‖) are based on the assumption of a constant balance 
sheet, i.e., no capital generation and no changes in RWA. The column ―accepted‖ addresses 
the possibility that the regulator will issue an exception declaring instruments issued as part 
of government support measures as CET1. In order to achieve the ratios in this column, the 
state would have to maintain its ―investment‖ in the banks throughout the period, assuming 
the CoCos conversion in new shares worth, as book value, the CoCos’ current value. 
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In the column ―as planned‖ we assume, regarding BCP, the exact fulfillment of the 
schedule disclosed in its recapitalization plan; it includes the € 500 million capital increase 
in 2012 (already completed) and the planned CoCos’ repayments: € 500 million in 2014, €1 
billion in 2015 and €1.5 billion in 2016. We assume BCP to generate exactly the capital 
needed to make these repayments; this will not likely be achieved without a new capital 
increase. The failure or success of this future capital increase will determine if the state gets 
a shareholder position in BCP, which can happen either through a new support measure or 
through the CoCos conversion that will occur if they are not completely repaid until June 
2017. 
BCP is in an extremely poor position, as it has five years to generate € 3 billion of capital to 
repay its CoCos, and it has recently recorded losses. If the bank improves the quality of its 
credit portfolio and becomes profitable, it could seek to issue more equity in order to 
comply with its capital requirements. However, this will be difficult to achieve. We believe 
that the most probable outcome regarding BCP is an extension of the state’s intervention, 
through either the CoCos’ conversion or through new measures. 
In the case of BPI, the column ―as planned‖ shows the € 200 million capital increase and € 
300 million CoCos repayments during the second half of 2012; we assume the uniform 
repayment of the €1.2 billion CoCos outstanding, beginning on January 1, 2013. BPI will 
need to generate, on average, € 267 million of capital per year in order to repay the CoCos 
before June 2017, a daunting amount in the current environment. However, given the 
bank’s profitability and excluding unforeseen events, BPI should not have any problem 
doing a capital increase. If both banks behave as displayed in the ―as planned‖ column, they 
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will be in a good position, without any equity capital needs. This case does not consider 
banks’ capital generation after June 30, 2017; thus, with more than 2.5 years of capital 
generation, these banks can have a considerable amount of excess capital above the 7% 
CET1 minimum planned to be enforced in 2019. 
BPI will need to generate close to € 267 million per year to repay its CoCos within the 
agreed timeframe. If this is achieved, BPI should have no difficulty complying with the 
CET1 minimum. Recently, BPI has been profitable; therefore, in case of need, it should be 
possible to increase its capital. If BPI performs in line with the above-mentioned ―as 
planned‖ case, they will have to start issuing AT1 and T2 instruments in 2017. However, if 
the bank continues to record profits, they could also use an early issuance to convey a 
positive sign to the market. 
Phased In Deductions 
BES: RWA = 64,906 ESFG: RWA = 67,855 
2013   6.633 10,4% 6.367 9,5% 
2014 20% 6.438 10,1% 5.881 8,8% 
2015 40% 6.243 9,8% 5.395 8,1% 
2016 60% 6.048 9,5% 4.909 7,4% 
2017 80% 5.853 9,2% 4.423 6,6% 
2018 100% 5.658 8,9% 3.937 5,9% 
The results in the table above are based on the assumption of a constant balance sheet, i.e., 
no capital generation and no changes in RWA. To cope with a 7% CET1 minimum, ESFG 
will need to generate close to € 626 million until the end of 2018; this should be feasible to 
achieve organically within the time frame for an institution of this size. As previously 
mentioned, the NCIs related to excess capital in banking subsidiaries do not count for a 
bank’s CET1; ESFG has close to € 1 billion deducted from its capital due to BES’ excess 
capital attributed to NCIs. At first sight it appears that if ESFG seeks to increase its CET1 
Table 3: BES and ESFG’s Core Equity Tier 1 ratios under CRD IV (values in € million) 
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ratio it could simply manage it by reducing BES capital (e.g., BES paying extraordinary 
dividends or repurchasing some of its own shares), thereby decreasing the deduction related 
to BES’ excess capital allocated to NCIs. In reality, this action would not work as it would 
reduce ESFG’s NCIs (that appear in the previous CT1 and in the CET1) related to BES by 
the same amount; the group cannot increase its capital ratio by decreasing the capital ratio 
of one of its subsidiaries. 
If the CRD IV package were fully implemented, BES’ excess capital would be higher than 
it is today due to the 7% CET1 minimum being considerably lower than the current 10% 
CT1 minimum; CRD IV’s deductions have a smaller impact than this decrease in the 
minimum core capital ratio. 
The high amount of excess CET1 capital allows for the possibility of BES not issuing as 
much AT1 and T2 instruments as the 1.5% and 2%, respectively, presented in the package 
as these instruments can be substituted by higher quality capital. This also allows future 
income distribution to shareholders if AT1 and T2 instruments can be issued at a reasonable 
cost. In the case of no capital generation, ESFG would have to start issuing AT1 and T2 
instruments in 2016 and BES in 2017. However, it is probable that they will start issuing 
earlier as a means to convey an image of a healthy financial group to the market. Issuing 
this kind of instruments will be close to impossible for BCP standalone, thus the most 
probable outcome is its continued reliance on some sort of state intervention, maybe a state 
guarantee concerning these instruments’ issuance. 
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The new deductions are made under the principle of a lack of confidence regarding the 
banks’ future performances, as it can be seen by the deduction of DTAs that rely on future 
profitability. Thus, the CRD IV penalizes the banks with the worst recent performance, not 
just considering their profitability related to net income but also other items not included in 
net income, e.g., unrealized losses in the AFS portfolio, and negative actuarial deviations. 
This makes sense and is decreasing the variance between regulatory capital and equity 
capital. The deduction regarding NCIs penalizes groups with large, not fully owned, 
subsidiaries, as these subsidiaries usually have large amounts of capital above the 
regulatory minimum, and the portion of this amount related to NCIs will be deducted. 
6. Liquidity requirements 
Basel III introduces two new liquidity requirements with the goal of making banks less 
dependent on short-term interbank funding. This type of funding is extremely sensitive to 
systemic shocks as observed in the recent financial crisis; in the case of the banks analyzed, 
temporary measures from the European Central Bank (ECB) are currently replacing this 
funding source. 
Basel III’s long-term liquidity requirement is the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR); it 
requires banks to have a higher amount of stable funding than long-term weighted assets 
(including off-balance sheet commitments). Long-term is defined as more than one year, 
and lower weights are given to shorter maturity assets and liabilities. This ratio is not in its 
final form and its parameters are being reviewed by the BCBS; it is not included in the 
CRD IV as an obligation, but it is slated for implementation in 2018. 
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The CRD IV proposal establishes the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), a liquidity 
requirement, to be introduced in 2015, concerning the need to match highly liquid assets 
with liquidity outflows during a stressed 30-day period. Systemic and idiosyncratic stresses 
are considered in the computation of the ratio in a way that replicates what would happen in 
a crisis like the recent one. 
The LCR is presented in detail in the CRD IV but it is not in its final form and includes 
ambiguous definitions. For instance, liquid transferable assets receive different treatments 
depending on whether they are of ―high liquidity and credit quality‖ or ―extremely high 
liquidity and credit quality‖; no cutoff credit rating is given to determine this. Deposits that 
are ―part of an established relationship making withdrawal highly unlikely‖ receive a lower 
weight as a liquidity outflow. A bank’s liquidity is impossible to define given such 
definitions. 
Current Portuguese regulation does not contain requirements similar to the previously 
mentioned ratios. BoP regulation regarding liquidity
26
 requires that banks report, every 
month, their detailed liquidity position to the supervisor. The maps that banks fill are 
detailed: each type of exposure is divided by maturity, allocating the values to six different 
maturity ranges. Unfortunately, this is not publicly available data. The BoP can request that 
banks meet the liquidity requirements it sees as appropriate on a case-by-case basis. 
Moreover, it recommends banks hold at least 15% of their deposits and other resources 
with a maturity below one month in the following liquid assets: cash, deposits in the BoP 
and in ―safe‖ banks (determined using credit ratings). 
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The European authorities, and even the BCBS
27
, can still review the LCR and, 
undoubtedly, have to issue some clarification regarding the definition of liquid assets and 
liquidity outflows. The Portuguese banks’ position will only be known at the time of the 
enforcement of the mandatory disclosure requirements regarding liquidity. 
7. Conclusion 
In this study, we carried out an estimate of the impact of the new Basel III rules on the 
Portuguese banking system. We analyzed the four main privately owned banks (BCP, BES, 
BPI and ESFG) and excluded the Government-owned CGD due to its easy access to state 
capital. 
In order to study the impact of the new capital-related Basel III rules, we calculated the 
banks’ core capital ratios using the new rules and analyzed the factors that cause them to be 
different from their current core capital ratios. The impact of Basel III’s liquidity rules 
could not be estimated due to their vague definitions and lack of bank-disclosed 
information. 
On average, Basel III will have a minor impact on these banks’ capital as the increase in 
deductions to core capital is balanced with the decrease in the requirement of a minimum 
core capital ratio—from 10% to 7%—though there are large differences between banks. 
Disregarding the classification of CoCos as capital or not, BPI suffers the largest impact (a 
decrease between 6.9% and 7.7% of its core capital ratio); this is mostly due to its hefty 
unrealized losses on June 30
t
, 2012. Disregarding its CoCos, the decrease in BCP’s core 
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capital ratio is between 3.4% and 4.2%, mainly due to its recent negative results. The 
possible exception of considering CoCos as CET1 capital is significant to both banks as, if 
there is no exception, they will not comply with the minimum capital ratios in the case of 
no capital generation. If they generate the required capital to repay CoCos according to 
their capitalization plans, they will be able to comply with the minimum capital ratios. 
The decrease of ESFG’s core capital ratio is 3.6%, largely due to BES’ NCIs. The decrease 
of BES’ capital ratio is 1.5%, less than the 3% decrease in the minimum core capital ratio; 
thus, BES’ excess core capital will increase under Basel III. We believe this group should 
have no difficulties complying with Basel III’s minimum capital requirements. 
The possibility that a common entity will supervise European banks is currently being 
discussed, and there have been developments regarding this ―banking union‖ indicating its 
implementation in 2014
28
. This could accelerate the issuance of the CRD IV’s final text, 
including detailed liquidity ratios, as it seems European countries are finding some 
common ground in their discussions regarding banking supervision. The ―banking union‖ 
could also contribute to greater uniformity in the calculation of banks’ capital; e.g., the risk 
weights assigned to exposures through banks’ internal models as these risk weights vary 
widely between southern and northern Europe. We believe that a ―banking union‖ would 
have a positive impact on the banks analyzed. 
Further studies could evaluate the impact of Basel III taking into consideration future 
scenarios regarding the Portuguese economy and credit portfolios’ quality. 
                                                          
28
 Council of the European Union 2012. Council agrees position on bank supervision. Brussels. 
28 
 
References 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). 2010 (revised 2011). Basel III: A global framework for 
more resilient banks and the banking system. Basel: Bank for International Settlements (BIS). 
BCBS. 2006. International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards – A Revised 
Framework – Comprehensive Version. Basel: BIS. 
BCBS. 2009. Revisions to the Basel II market risk framework. Basel: BIS.  
BCBS. 2009. Enhancements to the Basel II framework. Basel: BIS. 
BCBS. 2010. Basel III: International framework for liquidity risk measurement, standards and monitoring, 
Basel: BIS. 
BCBS. 2012. Basel III regulatory consistency assessment (Level 2) Preliminary report: European Union. 
Basel: BIS. 
Ingves, Stefan. 2012. Current focus of the Basel Committee: Raising the bar. Panama City: BIS. 
Council of the European Union. 2012. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms – Council general approach. 
Brussels.  
Council of the European Union. 2012. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions 
and investment firms and amending Directive 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms in a 
financial conglomerate – Council general approach. Brussels. 
Council of the European Union 2012. Council agrees position on bank supervision. Brussels. 
The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. 2010. Directive 2010/76/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 amending Directives 2006/48/EC and 
2006/49/EC as regards capital requirements for the trading book and for re-securitisations, and the 
supervisory review of remuneration policies. Official Journal of the European Union. 
European Banking Authority (EBA). 2011. EBA recommendation on the creation and supervisory 
oversight of temporary capital buffers to restore market confidence. London: EBA. 
EBA. 2012. Final report on the implementation of Capital Plans following the EBA’s 2011 Recommendation 
on the creation of temporary capital buffers to restore market confidence. EBA. 
EBA. 2012. EBA recapitalization exercise 2012 – PT054 – Banco Comercial Português, SA (BCP or 
Millenium BCP). 
EBA. 2012. EBA recapitalization exercise 2012 – PT055 – Espírito Santo Financial Group, SA (ESFG). 
EBA. 2012. EBA recapitalization exercise 2012 – PT056 – Banco BPI, SA. 
Banco de Portugal. 2007. Aviso do Banco de Portugal nº10/2007. 
Banco de Portugal. 2008. Aviso do Banco de Portugal nº11/2008 
Banco de Portugal. 2009. Instrução nº 13/2009.  
Banco de Portugal. 2009. Anexo à instrução nº 13/2009. 
Banco de Portugal. 2010. Aviso do Banco de Portugal nº6/2010. 
Banco de Portugal. 2011. Aviso do Banco de Portugal nº3/2011 
Banco de Portugal. 2011. Aviso do Banco de Portugal nº9/2011. 
Banco de Portugal. 2011. Portugal EU/IMF Financial Assistance Programme 2011-2014. Lisbon. 
Banco de Portugal. 2012. Aviso do Banco de Portugal nº5/2012. 
Banco Nacional de Angola. 2011. Aviso nº 5/2011. 
Banco Espírito Santo, S.A. 2012. Relatório e contas – Consolidado e individual – 1º Semestre de 2012. 
Banco Espírito Santo Angola. 2010. Relatório e contas. 
BESPAR Sociedade Gestora de Participações Sociais, S.A. 2011. Relatório e contas. 
29 
 
Espírito Santo Financial Group, S.A. 2012. Interim report. 
Banco Comercial Português, S.A. 2012. 2012 First half report. 
Bank Millennium S.A. Capital Group. 2012. Report of the Bank Millennium S.A. Capital Group for 1 half 
2012. 
Millennium BIM 2011. Relatório e contas. 
Millennium Angola. 2011. Relatório e contas. 
Banco Comercial Português, S.A. 2012. Capitalization Plan –Law 63-A/2008- June 4
, 
2012. 
Banco BPI. 2012. Relatório e contas – 1º Semestre de 2012. 
Banco de Fomento Angola. 2011. Relatório e contas. 
Banco BPI. 2012. Proposta. Ponto 1 da Ordem de Trabalhos da Assembleia Geral de Accionistas do Banco 
BPI S.A. de 27 de Junho de 2012. Anexo 1: Plano de Recapitalização. 
James, Benedict, and Andrew Forde. 2001. Comparison between Capital Requirements Directive IV and 
Basel III. London: Linklaters LLP. 
BPI Equity research. 2010. Iberian strategy 2011 – Mind the gap! – Banking sector. 
Peixoto, Carlos. 2012. Report about BES – July 2012. BPI Equity research. 
Peixoto, Carlos. 2012. Report about BES – September 2012. BPI Equity research. 
Peixoto, Carlos. 2012. Report about BES – November 2012. BPI Equity research. 
Silva, Rita. 2012. What’s good for Portugal is good for BPI – Valuation update – 15 October 2012. 
Millennium Investment Banking. 
Silva, Rita. 2012. BES: Still with maneuver to avoid state help – Valuation update – 13 July 2012. 
Millennium Investment Banking. 
Espirito Santo Investment Bank Research. 2012. Portuguese banks: In time for the EBA deadline – 5 June 
2012. Espirito Santo Investment Bank Research. 
Espirito Santo Investment Bank Research. 2012. Iberian banks: Another Quarter of Cleaning Up – 23 
October 2012. Espirito Santo Investment Bank Research. 
Espirito Santo Investment Bank Research. 2012. BCP: Is a 7.7% CT1 ratio enough? – 13 June 2012. 
Espirito Santo Investment Bank Research. 
Espirito Santo Investment Bank Research. 2012. BCP: A lot to do in the coming quarters – 6 November 
2012. Espirito Santo Investment Bank Research. 
Espirito Santo Investment Bank Research. 2012. BPI: As expected, repaying the CoCos is not an issue – 
13 June 2012. Espirito Santo Investment Bank Research. 
Espirito Santo Investment Bank Research. 2012. BPI: 1H12: Strong domestic performance – 26 July 2012. 
Espirito Santo Investment Bank Research. 
Espirito Santo Investment Bank Research. 2012. BPI: Portugal holds up – 25 October 2012. Espirito 
Santo Investment Bank Research. 
 
 
  
30 
 
Appendices 
Exhibit 1 
Table 4: Acronyms 
BCBS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
WP Work Project 
BCP Banco Comercial Português, S.A. 
BPI Banco Português de Investimentos, S.A.  
ESFG Espírito Santo Financial Group S.A 
BES Banco Espírito Santo S.A. 
EU European Union 
BoP Bank of Portugal 
EC European Comission 
BIS Bank for International Settlements 
RWA Risk Weighted Assets 
IRB Internal-ratings-based 
CRD Capital Requirements Directive 
CET1 Common Equity Tier 1 
AT1 Additional Tier 1 
T2 Tier 2 
CT1 Core Tier 1 
CGD Caixa Geral de Depósitos 
EEA European Economic Area 
NPLs Non-performing loans 
EBA European Banking Authority 
CoCos Contingent convertibles 
NCIs Non-controlling interests 
AFS Available-for-sale 
DTAs Deferred tax assets 
DTLs Deferred tax liabilities 
ECB European Central Bank 
NSFR Net Stable Funding Ratio 
LCR Liquidity Coverage Ratio 
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Exhibit 2 
Table 5: From CT1 to CET1 without an exception regarding CoCos 
(€ million) BCP BES BPI ESFG 
Current CT1 6.738 6.708 3.691 6.442 
 
Excess of expected IRB losses over existing impairment allowances -411 -75 0 -75 
 
Non-compliant hybrid instruments included in CT1 -3.000 0 -1.551 0 
 
Minority interests in non-banking entities or non-CET1 instruments 0 -92 -8 -376 
 
Excess of minority banking interests above the regulatory minimum -154 -159 -158 -1.094 
 
Negative AFS and cash flow hedging reserves added back to CT1 -199 -131 -845 -74 
 
DTAs that rely on future profitability -475 -64 -104 -89 
 
Defined benefit pension deficit -320 -194 -149 -194 
Preliminary CET1 2.178 5.992 877 4.539 
DTAs: rely on future profitability and arise from temporary differences 1.105 697 630 709 
 
Excess above 10% of Preliminary CET1 -> deduction -888 -98 -543 -255 
Significant investments in financial institutions  415 536 183 574 
 
Excess above 10% of Preliminary CET1 -> deduction -197 0 -95 -120 
Sum of non-deducted DTAs (temp. Diff.) and significant investments 436 1.135 175 908 
 
Excess above 15% of Preliminary CET1 -> deduction -109 -236 -44 -227 
Common Equity Tier I 984 5.658 196 3.937 
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Exhibit 3 
Table 6: From CT1 to CET1 with an exception regarding CoCos 
(€ million) BCP BES BPI ESFG 
Current CT1 6.738 6.708 3.691 6.442 
 
Excess of expected IRB losses over existing impairment allowances -411 -75 0 -75 
 
Non-compliant hybrid instruments included in CT1 0 0 -51 0 
 
Minority interests in non-banking entities or non-CET1 instruments 0 -92 -8 -376 
 
Excess of minority banking interests above the regulatory minimum -154 -159 -158 -1.094 
 
Negative AFS and cash flow hedging reserves added back to CT1 -199 -131 -845 -74 
 
DTAs that rely on future profitability -475 -64 -104 -89 
 
Defined benefit pension deficit -320 -194 -149 -194 
Preliminary CET1 5.178 5.992 2.377 4.539 
DTAs: rely on future profitability and arise from temporary differences 1.105 697 630 709 
 
Excess above 10% of Preliminary CET1 -> deduction -588 -98 -393 -255 
Significant investments in financial institutions  415 536 183 574 
 
Excess above 10% of Preliminary CET1 -> deduction 0 0 0 -120 
Sum of non-deducted DTAs (temp. Diff.) and significant investments 932 1.135 420 908 
 
Excess above 15% of Preliminary CET1 -> deduction -156 -236 -64 -227 
Common Equity Tier I 4.434 5.658 1.921 3.937 
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Exhibit 4 
Table 7: BPI’s capital ratios depending on its unrealized losses (values in € million). 
As planned 
Phased In 
Deductions 
Base case No losses in Portuguese bonds No AFS/Cash Flow hedge losses 
BPI: RWA = 25,410 BPI: RWA = 25,410 BPI: RWA = 25,410 
2013   2.907 11,5% 2.907 11,5% 2.907 11,5% 
2014 20% 2.785 11,1% 2.887 11,5% 3.048 12,1% 
2015 40% 2.662 10,6% 2.868 11,4% 3.188 12,7% 
2016 60% 2.540 10,1% 2.848 11,3% 3.329 13,2% 
2017 80% 2.285 9,1% 2.695 10,7% 3.337 13,2% 
2018 100% 1.896 7,5% 2.409 9,6% 3.211 12,7% 
 
As displayed in the table above, if BPI recovers from its current unrealized losses 
concerning securities in the AFS portfolio and cash flow hedge, it would have a large 
amount of excess capital; the recovery of the Portuguese bonds’ prices is essential to this. 
The column ―No losses in Portuguese bonds‖ takes into consideration, as the only change 
from the base case, no unrealized losses in the Portuguese bonds in the AFS portfolio. 
There is a large position in interest rate derivatives and no information about their 
underlying assets; thus, we assume none are directly related to Portuguese bonds. We 
assume that DTAs generated by unrealized losses in Portuguese bonds are the same 
percentage as in the whole AFS portfolio, close to 30% of the associated losses. 
 
